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substitute to the unpopular bailout approach. This paper discusses some of its 
key potential shortcomings. It explains why bail-in regimes will fail to eradicate 
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A Critical Evaluation of Bail-in as a Bank Recapitalisation Mechanism 
 
 
A.  Introductory Remarks 
 
The scale of losses flowing from bank failures is initially independent of the identity 
of those upon whom the burden of meeting that loss falls.  But, such losses also can 
then entail critical externalities. These have traditionally justified the public bailouts 
to avoid the systemic threat that the failure of any bank beyond a certain size carries 
with it.  
 
Nevertheless, public bailouts of banks are a source of moral hazard and they 
undermine market discipline. One of the key principles of a free market economy is 
that owners and creditors are supposed to bear the losses of a failed venture. Bailouts 
can also have a destabilizing impact on public finances and sovereign debt, with UK 
and Irish finances being held as illustrative examples of the impact of such costs.
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These concerns have given rise to reforms to internalize the costs of bank failure of 
which the foremost is the drawing up of bank creditor bail-ins. Essentially, bail-in 
constitutes a radical rethinking of who bears the ultimate costs of the operation of 
fractional reserve banking. 
 
A great momentum has built up for basing resolution on bail-in, which sometimes 
resembles a ‘chorus’ (wording used in McAndrews, et al, (2014), p. 14).  The 
regulatory authorities in most of the world’s developed economies have developed, or 
are in the process of developing, resolution regimes that allow, in principle, banks to 
fail without resorting to public funding.  
 
The bail-in approach is intended to counter the dual threat of systemic disruption and 
sovereign over-indebtedness. It is based on the penalty principle, namely, that the 
costs of bank failures are shifted to where they best belong: bank shareholders and 
creditors.  Namely, bail-in replaces the public subsidy with private penalty (Huertas, 
2013) or with private insurance (KPMG, 2012; Gordon, Ringe, 2014) forcing banks to 
internalize the cost of risks which they assume.  
 
In these new schemes, apart from the shareholders, the losses of bank failure are to be 
borne by ex ante (or ex post) funded resolution funds, financed by industry levies, and 
certain classes of bank creditors whose fixed debt claims on the bank will be 
converted to equity, thereby restoring the equity buffer needed for on-going bank 
operation.   
 
This is an important development, since in the past banks’ subordinated debt did not 
provide any cover when bank liquidation was not an option, which meant that 
subordinated creditors were bailed out alongside senior creditors by taxpayers 
(Gleeson, 2012). This led to creditor inertia.  
 
                                                        
1 This is a nearly undisputable argument against bailouts and is fully endorsed in this paper. 
However, bailout costs cannot be accurately measured unless the costs of the alternative: 
instability are also counted (Dewatripont, 2014). 
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Turning unsecured debt into bail-in-able debt should incentivize creditors to resume a 
monitoring function, thereby helping to restore market discipline. For example, as the 
potential costs of bank failure would fall on creditors, in addition to shareholders, 
such creditors should become more alert about the levels of leverage the bank carries 
(Coffee, 2011), limiting one of the most likely causes of bank failures and the 
governance costs associated with excessive leverage (Admati et al. 2013; Avgouleas 
and Cullen, 2014b). Normally, shareholders have every incentive to build leverage to 
maximize their return on equity (Admati et al. 2012; Avgouleas and Cullen 2014a).  
 
Such monitoring might, in turn, reduce the scale of loss in the event of a bank failure: 
creditors could force the bank to behave more cautiously, especially where the bail-in 
regime allows for earlier intervention and closure than a bail-out mechanism. It 
should also, in principle, eliminate the ‘too-big-to-fail’ subsidy enjoyed by bigger 
banks.  
 
Essentially, bail-in provisions mean that, to a certain extent, a pre-planned contract 
replaces the bankruptcy process giving greater certainty (Coffee, 2011) as regards the 
sufficiency of funds to cover bank losses and facilitating early recapitalisation. 
Moreover, the bail-in tool can be used to keep the bank as a going concern and avoid 
disruptive liquidation or dis-membering of the financial institution in distress. 
 
But the idea that the penalty for failure can be shifted onto an institution, such as a 
bank, is incorrect.  Ultimately all penalties, and similarly benefits, have to be 
absorbed by individuals, not inanimate institutions. When it is said that the bank will 
pay the penalty of failure, this essentially means that the penalty is paid, in the guise 
of worsened terms, by bank managers, bank staff, bank creditors or borrowers. The 
real question is which individuals will be asked to absorb the cost.   
 
The goals of the bail-in process are not the same in every jurisdiction. In the United 
States the process through which bail-in and subsequent conversion of creditor claims 
takes place for SIFIs is imbedded in the mechanics and architecture of the resolution 
process that is applied to systemically important institutions, the so-called Orderly 
Liquidation Authority (OLA) of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010. This means that triggering the bail-in process 
under Title II aims at providing with sufficient capital the entities that will emerge 
following liquidation of the resolved parent institution (see section B below).  
 
In the European Union, on the other hand, the doom-loop between bank instability 
and sovereign indebtedness has left Eurozone governments with a major conundrum. 
The traditional route of a public bailout is increasingly ruled out, not only due to a 
principled adherence to the avoidance of moral hazard, but also due to its potential 
impact on already heavily indebted countries. To answer this challenge, the Eurozone 
has established the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to act, amongst other 
purposes, as an essential component of the European Banking Union (EBU). Both the 
ESM statute and the new EU Resolution regime based on the forthcoming EU Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) require the prior participation of bank 
creditors in meeting the costs of bank resolution. This means that either the bank 
remains a going concern and the bail-in process is triggered to effect bank 
recapitalization to restore it to health (‘‘open bank’’ bail-in process) or in conjunction 
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with the exercise of resolution powers treating the bank as gone concern (‘‘closed 
bank” bail-in process). This contrasts with DFA’s appro 
ach to SIFI resolution, discussed in section B(1) below, where only the second 
approach is used. This bifurcation is likely to prove problematic.2 
  
Similarly, the intention is that intervention will be sooner (forbearance less), so that 
losses will be less, but whether that hope will be justified is yet to be seen.  We 
discuss this further in section C below. 
  
The desire to find an effective way to replace the public subsidy and the 
unpopular bailout process is entirely understandable and can lead to welfare 
enhancing outcomes. At the same, time, there is a danger of over-reliance on bail-
ins, in part owing to the growing momentum for its introduction.  One useful role 
for an academic is to query contemporary enthusiasm for fear of group-think, 
which the last crisis has shown may prove a dangerous aspect of policy-making 
in the financial sector.  In placing bail-in at the heart of bank resolution regimes, 
legislators and regulatory authorities ought not to overlook some important 
shortcomings attached to this approach. This paper sets out to discuss these 
shortcomings and to explain why, arguably, bail-in regimes will not remove, in the 
case of resolution of a large complex cross-border bank, (unless the risk is 
idiosyncratic, for example fraud), or in the event of a systemic crisis, the need for 
public injection of funds. In our analysis we particularly focus on BRRD’s distinction 
between the resolution of banks that have become bankrupt (“gone concern”), from 
the recapitalization (also as part of the resolution regime) of banks that have become 
so fragile as to need intervention and recapitalization, but are not (yet) bankrupt, 
(“going concern”).  Although this distinction is hallowed in the literature, we argue 
that it may be less clear-cut in practice than is sometimes suggested.  
 
 
 
B.   The Architecture of the Bail-in Process 
 
1.  Bank resolution and Bank Bail-in under the Dodd Frank Act (DFA) 
 
(a) Overview 
 
Under section 204(a) (1) of the Dodd Frank Act creditors and shareholders bear all 
the losses of the financial company that has entered OLA. This is in accord with one 
of the Act’s explicit aims, as stated in its preamble: “to protect the American taxpayer 
by ending bailouts.” To this effect, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act provides the FDIC 
with new powers to resolve SIFIs. Under OLA, the FDIC may be appointed receiver 
for any U.S. financial company that meets specified criteria when resolution under the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code (or other relevant insolvency process) would be likely to create 
systemic instability.  
                                                        
2
 Notably, although both the US and the European authorities are moving simultaneously towards 
reliance on bail-in mechanisms, we are struck by how little attention appears to be paid in each to the 
detail of what the other is doing.  It is instructive that in the FRBNY Special Issue on ‘Large and 
Complex Banks’ (2014), the papers by McAndrews, et al, and Sommer hardly mention Basel III, the 
BRRD or any European initiative. Equally much of the discussion within Europe on its own resolution 
mechanisms ignores the DFA, and looks inwards. 
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In order to make group resolution effective and to minimize systemic disruption, the 
FDIC has decided that it will follow the Single Point of Entry approach (SPOE) 
(FDIC, 2013), which is the final step in the implementation of the ‘‘source-of-
strength” doctrine (enshrined in section 616(d) of the DFA). In the event of bank 
failure the top-tier holding company will have to enter into receivership and attendant 
losses will be borne by the holding company’s shareholders and unsecured creditors. 
Section 210(a)(1)(M) of the Act provides that the FDIC, as the receiver for a covered 
financial company, succeeds by operation of law to all the rights, titles, powers, and 
privileges possessed by, inter alia, the creditors of the resolved and all rights and 
claims that the stockholders and creditors of the resolved institution may have against 
its assets are terminated, but for their right to receive payment under the provisions of 
section 210. The FDIC would then form a bridge holding company (“Newco”)3 and 
transfer the failed holding company’s ownership of healthy operating subsidiaries into 
it, leaving the holding company shareholders and creditors behind in the estate of the 
failed holding company. Operating subsidiaries that face no solvency problem will be 
transferred to the new solvent entity or entities (NewCo).  
 
Section 210 requires the FDIC to conduct a claims process and establish a claims 
priority pyramid for the satisfaction of claims against the resolved entity without the 
use of taxpayer funds. At the conclusion of this process claims against the 
receivership would be satisfied through a debt-for-securities exchange in accordance 
with their priority under section 210 through the issuance of debt and equity in the 
new holding company.  
 
Prior to the exchange of securities for claims, the FDIC would determine the value of 
the bridge financial company based upon a valuation performed by the consultants 
selected by the board of the bridge financial company. Yet the FDIC has stated that it 
expects “shareholders’ equity, subordinated debt and a substantial portion of the 
unsecured liabilities of the holding company—with the exception of essential 
vendors’ claims— to remain as claims against the receivership.” (FDIC, 2013).  
 
This is essentially the bail-in process under Title II, which aims at giving the 
NewCo what is essentially a clean bill of health rather than turning unsecured 
creditors into NewCo shareholders. OLA’s bail-in process will be utilized to 
resolve  the holding company (‘‘closed bank” process), although the operating 
subsidiaries remain unaffected, and, thus, it differs from the BRRD approach that 
provides, in addition, the option to use an “open bank” bail-in process.  
 
By establishing the bridge financial company with significant assets of the parent 
holding company and many fewer liabilities, it is hoped that the bridge financial 
company would have a strong balance sheet that would put it in a good position 
to borrow money from customary market sources. The FDIC has indicated that 
contingent value rights, such as warrants or options allowing the purchase of 
equity in the new holding company or other instruments, might be issued to 
                                                        
3
 “The term ‘bridge financial company’ means a new financial company organized by the Corporation 
in accordance with section 210(h) for the purpose of resolving a covered financial company.” (Dodd-
Frank, Title II, Sec. 201 (3)). 
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enable funding the transition/resolution (FDIC, 2013). If there are shortfalls or 
these sources of funding are not readily available, the SPOE approach offers the 
benefit of FDIC’s access to the Orderly Liquidation Fund (OLF), provided that 
borrowings from the fund can be fully secured and repaid. Any costs incurred by 
the FDIC as the appointed receiver or other public authority which cannot be 
covered by the above will be recovered from the industry. 
 
The bail-in approach is not new in US bank resolution practice. For example, in 
2008, the FDIC exercised its existing powers and resolved the part of the 
Washington Mutual group that was not sold to JP Morgan Chase, mainly claims 
by equity holders and creditors, under the least-cost resolution method. It 
imposed serious losses on the unsecured creditors and uninsured depositors 
(deposit amount above USD 100,000).4 OLA further expands the resolution 
authority of FDIC, including its power to cherry-pick which assets and liabilities 
to transfer to a third party, (though these will be subject to strict conditions to be 
further detailed by the FDIC) and to treat similarly situated creditors differently, 
e.g., favouring short-term creditors over long-term creditors or favouring 
operating creditors over lenders or bondholders. This discretion is curbed by the 
introduction of a safeguard that creditors are entitled to receive at least what 
they would have received if liquidation had taken place under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (comparable to the “best interests of creditors” test under the 
Bankruptcy Code). 
 
(b) Evaluation  
 
Although TARP and other forms of direct bank capitalization by the US Treasury 
during the 2008 crisis did not prove to be loss-making, the issue of moral hazard 
and principled opposition to a private company receiving public assistance in 
bankruptcy means that one of DFA’s key rationales is exclusion of bailouts. Thus, 
as mentioned earlier, OLA treats the holding company as a bankrupt (gone) 
concern. There may, however, be some caveats. 
 
First, the dismemberment of the parent holding company, in order to provide the 
necessary funding for the recapitalization of the operating banking 
subsidary(ies) may have reputational impact on the entire group, including the 
(seemingly unaffected) operating subsidiaries.  
 
For example, Bank Majestic Holding Co. liquidation will inevitably be 
accompanied by round the clock media coverage. It is hard to imagine what that 
would mean to the ordinary bank depositor and financial consumer. It is very 
likely that they will assume that Bank Majestic (operational) is also endangered.  
One reasonable remedy would be to have the names of the holding company, and 
the operational subsidiary(ies), separated (ring-fenced), but which part of the 
group gets which (name) will be an issue with potential consequences for 
franchise value.  Also such name separation may not work, as it would not be 
very hard for the media to explain to ordinary depositors and consumers that it 
                                                        
4
 FDIC Press Release, ‘Information for Claimants in Washington Mutual Bank’ 29 September 2008, 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08085b.html 
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is the parent company of Majestic has entered into liquidation. A further route 
would be to conduct OLA in utter secrecy and just announce the parent’s 
liquidation once the process has been concluded. But stock exchange rule 
implications, notices to affected bank creditors, potential litigation, and the 
structure of OLA itself in DFA, which involves so many stakeholders, makes such 
a “secrecy” approach impossible. 
 
Could the subsidiary bank, with help from the authorities, really handle the 
reputational fall-out?5  Historical evidence of reputational contagion, e.g. in the 
case of certain solvent subsidiaries of BCCI, would suggest that this could be a 
real danger.  If such depositor flight should then occur, the Central Bank (or in 
the USA the Orderly Liquidation Fund) might have to pump in large amounts of 
liquidity.  While this would be protected by seniority and collateral, the previous 
buffer represented by the holding company’s capital would, at least initially, no 
longer be there.  So a large portion of the operating company’s continuing 
liabilities might come either from the Central Bank (or OLF) or be backed by the 
deposit insurance fund, with some potential call on public support. 
 
The second question is about the speed of rebuilding the capital structure of the 
new HoldCo after the bankruptcy of the initial holding company.  While bail-in is 
not taken in isolation but is part of a restructuring process under which 
management is replaced and group business restructured, if the new HoldCo’s 
capital structure is not rapidly rebuilt, one would be left with an initially thinly 
capitalized operating bank (Sommer, 2014) plus large public sector liabilities. 
The government cannot force private sector buyers to purchase new equity and 
(subordinated) debt in a new HoldCo, and the prior experience would make 
private buyers wary.  Certainly the authorities could require the operating bank 
to retain all earnings, (e.g. no dividends, buy-backs, etc.), but in a generalized 
financial crisis, it could take a long time to regenerate a new holding company by 
building up retained earnings.  Of course, the authorities could massively 
expedite the process by injecting new capital into a new HoldCo, (with the aim of 
selling off such equity later back to the private sector), but that would just be 
another form of bail-out.  While the HoldCo proposal has been carefully worked 
out in its initial stage, what is less clear is what might then happen in the 
convalescent period.  
 
The third question is about costs to the rest of the sector of rolling over maturing 
bail-inable debt, once it has been announced that losses have been imposed on 
Majestic Holdings’ holders of bail-inable debt in the event of Majestic’s failure. 
The cost of such debt could spike and HoldCos might be tempted to let their own 
buffers slip below the required level.  Of course regulatory authorities could 
impose sanctions in such cases. But in doing so they will have to consider the impact 
of rising funding costs to the sector, both in terms of operating costs and in terms of 
solvency if such intervention takes place, as is likely, in a recessionary economic 
climate or worse during a generalized bank asset crisis. 
                                                        
5 No doubt the resolution would have to be accompanied by a careful communication strategy, 
but the example of Northern Rock shows how this can go wrong. 
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The fourth question relates to the interaction between the DFA approach and the 
Basel III capital requirements, which appear to necessitate an earlier 
intervention approach than DFA’s OLA.  Under the latter, the authorities should 
intervene to resolve a bank whenever its core tier 1 equity falls below 4½% of 
Risk Weighted Assets.  A bank with CT1E between 0 and 4½% is not formally 
insolvent, i.e., it is still “going”, rather than “gone”, concern.  It is to be hoped that 
regulators would intervene in a failing bank before the formal insolvency point is 
reached.  But then they would not be able to bail-in senior unsecured debtors 
under the ‘‘no creditor worse off” (NCWO) condition.  Either all the debt in the 
HoldCo, comprising subordinated debt or contingent capital instruments (Co-
Cos), would have to be designated as bail-in-able, which could have a 
considerable effect on bank funding costs, or the authorities could just not take 
pre-emptive action, disregarding the Basel III requirement.  Either route might 
prove problematic. 
 
NY Federal Reserve staff express the opinion that US authorities will disregard 
the Basel III requirement (of earlier intervention/recapitalization) (McAndrews, 
et al, (2014)), and go on to state that ‘‘[t]he resolution authority in our model is 
“slow” in the sense that it will shut down and resolve a firm only once its (book) 
equity capital is exhausted” (McAndrews, et al, (2014), p. 5, also p. 15 and 
footnote 16 therein).  Perhaps because the costs of such a slow response are 
recognized, McAndrews et al. express a preference for specially designed bail-
inable debt to an equivalent amount of extra equity (McAndrews, et al, (2014), 
section 4, pp 14-23). Issued ex ante and specially designed to absorb conversion 
or write down losses subordinated debt (called hereinafter D bail-inable debt), 
essentially a form of pre-paid insurance for bank failure (Gordon, Ringe, 2014) 
has specific advantages and costs. Some of the advantages might remain 
unproven.  
 
McAndrews, et al suggest that the existence of sufficient D bail-inable debt would 
force earlier intervention by the authorities, before all the loss-making buffer 
had been eaten away.  But if the trigger for intervention is to be book value 
insolvency, it will still be applied far too late to be optimal.  If intervention is to 
be triggered earlier, prior to book value insolvency, the bank is not legally a 
“gone concern”, making the satisfaction of NCWO principle problematic.  At this 
stage, it remains unclear how US authorities intend to resolve this conundrum. 
 
2.  The FDIC-BoE Approach to Resolving G-SiFIs and Bail-in 
 
Dodd-Frank explicitly authorizes coordination with foreign authorities to take 
action to resolve those institutions whose collapse threatens financial stability 
(Title II, section 210, N). A heat-map exercise conducted by US regulators 
determined that the operations of U.S. SIFIs are concentrated in a relatively small 
number of jurisdictions, particularly the United Kingdom (UK) (Gruenpeng 
(Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) 2012 ). Thus, the US and UK 
authorities proceeded to examine potential impediments to efficient resolutions and 
on a cooperative basis explored methods of resolving them. 
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This culminated in the joint discussion paper published by the Bank of England (BOE) 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) titled, Resolving Globally 
Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions comparing the resolution regime 
established by Dodd Frank Act Title II to the resolution powers of the UK’s Prudent 
Regulation Authority (PRA). To this effect the two authorities have proposed that they 
will adopt the single “point of entry" (SPOE) approach, when appropriate,6 in the 
resolution of G-SIFIs. 
 
The main implication of the SPOE approach to resolution is that G-SIFIs would 
have to put in place: 
 a group structure based on a parent holding company (HoldCo); 
 the ring-fencing of (domestic and overseas) subsidiaries that undertake critical 
economic activities, so that the continuity of these activities can be more easily 
maintained in a resolution; 
 Issuance of bail-inable debt by the holding company to enable the group to be 
recapitalised in a resolution through the conversion of this debt into equity; 
 Holding company debt will be used to make loans to subsidiaries, so that 
subsidiaries can be supported in a resolution through writing off these loans. 
Although initially a group taken into resolution would be ‘‘owned” by the FDIC 
(in the US) or, perhaps, under a trustee arrangement (in the UK), the intention is 
that the group would be returned to private ownership, with the creditors whose 
debt is converted into equity becoming the new owners of the group. Both the 
BRRD and the UK Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, implementing 
government’s plans to introduce, with modifications, the Vickers’ Report 
recommendations, include requirements that banks have sufficient capital and 
debt in issue to make them resolvable using bail-in or other resolution tools. 
 
Under the HoldCo approach the continuity of critical economic activities is 
preserved because – in most cases – the subsidiaries of the holding company 
should be able to continue in operation, either because they have remained 
solvent and viable, or because they can be recapitalised through the writing 
down of intra-group loans made from the holding company to its subsidiaries. A 
subsidiary would need to be resolved independently only where it had suffered 
large losses. 
 
Under the FDIC-BoE joint paper, in the UK the equity and debt of a resolved 
holding company would be held initially by a trustee, though the BRRD now 
provides alternative methods as well (Arts 47, 48, 50 ).  The trustee would hold 
these securities during a valuation period.  The valuation is undertaken to assess 
the extent to which the size of the losses already incurred by the firm or 
expected to be incurred can be ascertained in order to determine the extent of 
required recapitalization.  Namely, valuation of losses determines the extent to 
which creditor claims should be written down and converted.  During this 
period, listing of the company’s equity securities (and potentially debt securities) 
would be suspended.   
                                                        
6  The joint Paper recognizes that multiple point of entry (MPE) may be more appropriate in 
some cases of complex cross-border banks. 
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Once the amount of required recapitalisation requirement has been determined, 
an announcement of the final terms of the bail-in would be made to the previous 
security holders. On completion of the exchange the trustee would transfer the 
equity to the original creditors. Creditors unable to hold equity securities (e.g. 
because they cannot legally hold equity shares) will be able to request the 
trustee to sell the equity securities on their behalf. The trust would then be 
dissolved and the equity securities of the firm would resume trading. 
 
We discuss the additional questions raised by cross-border banking, which, 
however, will be the norm for most SIFIs and by definition for GSIFIs, in 
Appendix A. 
 
3. The European Approach 
 
Bail-in is a pre-condition for bank resolution in the EU and for (ultimately) ESM 
implemented bank recapitalization within the Eurozone. In a nutshell before a 
Member State is allowed to tap ESM resources for direct recapitalization of a failing 
bank, a round of bail-in and national contributions must have taken place. National 
regulators must first impose initial losses representing at least 8% of the bank’s 
liabilities on shareholders and creditors (Art. 38 and 39 of the BRRD (as finalized by  
EU Council Decision, Dec. 2013)) before they can use the national resolution fund to 
absorb losses or to inject fresh capital into an institution, and then only up to 5% of 
the bank’s liabilities. In the event that bank losses exceed 13% of its liabilities, a 
further bail-in round may take place in order for the residual losses to be absorbed by 
creditors and non-guaranteed and non- preferred depositors before public money and 
then ESM funds are used. These conditions make ESM assistance an absolute last 
resort in order both to counter moral hazard and to allay any fears of de facto 
mutualization of liability for bank rescues in the Eurozone.
7
 It is clear that the EU 
holds high hopes about the effectiveness of this mechanism, an approximation to 
which has already been tried in Cyprus in March 2013
8
 and for the restructuring of the 
Spanish banking sector.
9 It is also hoped that bail-in will nullify the need for state 
                                                        
7
 Use of ESM funds when a bank public bail-out proves to be necessary is subject to a number of strict 
conditions. The ESM may intervene directly only at the request of a Member State stating that it is 
unable to provide the requisite funds on its own without endangering the sustainability of its public 
finances or its market access. The relevant institution will also have to be a systemic bank, and the 
difficulties it faces must threaten the euro zone’s financial stability. The ESM takes action only jointly 
with this Member State, which ensures that countries have an incentive to curb the use of public funds 
as far as possible. See Arts 1-3 of ESM Guideline on Financial Assistance for the Recapitalisation of 
Financial Institutions.  
8
  While the authorities would say that the Cypriot case was very different, given the absence of the 
resolution tools provided by the BRRD, we feel that its implementation gave important further 
momentum to the adoption of bail-in processes. 
 
9
 Under the terms of bankruptcy reorganization of Bankia and of four other Spanish banks, and in 
accordance with the conditions of the July 2012 Memorandum of Understanding between the Troika 
(EC, ECB, and IMF) and Spain, over 1 million small depositors became Bankia shareholders after they 
had been sold “preferentes” (preferred stock) in exchange for their deposits (FROB, July & Dec. 2012). 
Following the conversion, the preferentes took an initial write-down of 30-70%, which became much 
wider when the value of Bankia shares eventually collapsed (originally valued at EUR 2 per share, 
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aid for the banking sector across the EU and not just within the confines of the 
Eurozone (Angeloni, Lennihan, 2014). 
 
Yet the legal entity by legal entity approach raises its own set of difficult issues. In the 
case of non-EBU groups, resolution colleges might smooth co-ordination issues but, a 
bail-in decision has distributional consequences, potentially with clear losers. So in 
some cases it might even create a crisis of confidence in a member state’s banking 
system, and strong disagreements are bound to arise as to which subsidiary is bailed-
in and which is not. Where there are subsidiaries in non-EBU European countries 
such disagreements could even go as far as creating serious problems in the 
relationship of the EBU with non-EBU European countries, especially where losses 
are bound to fall unevenly. The obvious solution is to follow a group-based resolution 
approach and aggregate all losses to the group entity in accordance with the US 
model, but that would seem to us to reinforce subsidiarisation, which goes against the 
operating principles and constitutional freedoms underpinning the single European 
market.
10
  
 
Another significant challenge that the EU approach to bail-in raises is the 
aforementioned issue of liquidity support from resolution funds and central banks. 
This could be provided either to each legal entity, against the collateral available to 
that entity, or channeled through a parent company. In either case, if that happens 
within the Eurozone, all liquidity funding from the central banks would eventually 
have to be booked on the ECB’s balance sheet, at least until the bank is successfully 
restructured. 
 
C.  Problems of Bail-in for a ‘‘going concern” bank 
 
1.   Effective Resolution Substitute? 
 
While OLA provides for the liquidation of the bank holding company, it uses bail-in 
to leave operating subsidiaries unaffected. The EU, on the other hand, has an “open” 
bank resolution process that is reliant on the successful bail-in of the ailing bank.  So 
both jurisdictions view the bail-in process as a substitute to liquidation of either the 
entire group or of parts of the group, combined of course with the use of other 
resolution tools. This is not an unreasonable approach, especially in the case of a 
largely idiosyncratic cause of failure, e.g., fraud. But there are four essential 
conditions that have to be met when using the bail-in process as a resolution 
substitute: timing, market confidence, the extent of restructuring required, and 
accurate determination of losses. 
 
First, the issue of when to trigger the bail-in process, taking also into account the 
                                                                                                                                                              
which was further devalued to EUR 0.1 after the March 2013 restructuring of Bankia. ‘Bankia Press 
Release, ‘BFA-Bankia expects to culminate recapitalisation in May’ March 2013, available at 
http://www.bankia.com/en/communication/in-the-news/news/bfa-bankia-expects-to-culminate-
recapitalisation-in-may.html 
10
 See on this point Charles Randell, ‘The Tale of Two Banks’ paper presented in the LSE Conference 
“Managing and Financing European Bank Resolution” and discussant’s comment by Emilios 
Avgouleas both available at http://www.systemicrisk.ac.uk/sites/default/files/media/%28Final%29-
24th%20March%20programme%20-
%20Managing%20and%20financing%20European%20bank%20resolution.pdf  
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requirements of early intervention regimes (e.g., Art. 23 et. seq. BRRD), is matter of 
cardinal importance. Identification of the right time and conditions to trigger the bail-
in tool in a process that extends conversion beyond specially designed bail-able debt 
will be one of the most important for any bank supervisor. The reasoning leading to 
supervisors’ decision will much resemble first and second order problems in 
mathematics and logic. If the supervisor triggers bail-in early, then the full measure of 
losses may not have been fully revealed, risking further rounds of bail-in. But if the 
supervisor determines to use the bail-in tool at a later stage, when the full scale of 
losses to be imposed on creditors is revealed, they risk a flight of bank creditors who 
do not hold D bail-able debt.  
 
Moreover, speed of resolution/recapitalization (albeit at the expense of flexibility) is 
one of the reasons for the popularity of bail-in among regulators (Sommer, 2014). 
Yet, we doubt whether the adoption of bail-in regimes would lead to earlier regulatory 
intervention than under the bail-out regimes. The aforementioned paper by 
McAndrews, et al, reinforce our view that legal concerns about imposing potentially 
large losses on private creditors could unduly delay resolution, perhaps until the last 
possible minute.  By then the liabilities needed to be written down could extend 
beyond HoldCo’s specially designated bail-inable debt.  Bail-out, being undertaken 
by the authority of the government, is, we would argue, somewhat less liable to legal 
suit than bail-in.  On the other hand, bail-in of bank liabilities that extends beyond D 
bail-able debt affects a wider range of creditors; there are more parties to the 
negotiation, and hence that may be more protracted.  
 
In our view, the more delayed will be the onset of Resolution, the more essential it 
will be to put more emphasis on an earlier Recovery phase.  
 
There are also other concerns. In the absence of a fiscal backstop for other parts of the 
financial system, if bail-in is triggered before measures have been taken to buttress 
the rest of the financial system a creditor flight from other banks will be certain, 
spreading the tremors throughout the financial system, even if those banks retain 
sufficient amounts of D bail-in able debt. Timothy Geithner has eloquently explained 
this situation
11
: 
“The overwhelming temptation [in a crisis] is to let the most egregious firms fail, 
to put them through a bankruptcy-type process like the FDIC had for community 
banks and then haircut their bondholders.  But unless you have the ability to 
backstop every other systemic firm that’s in a similar position, you’ll just 
intensify fears of additional failures and haircuts.” 
 
Secondly, market confidence in the bailed-in institution would have to be quickly 
restored in order to preserve franchise value and repay official liquidity support 
(Sommer, 2014). As mentioned in section B(1)(b) above this is mostly dependent on 
how fast the capital structure of the requisite bank (or the new bank in the event of a 
“closed” bank process) is rebuilt. If the institution has entered into a death spiral with 
customers, creditors and depositors fast disappearing reversing the trend would 
doubtlessly prove a task of daunting proportions. 
 
Thirdly, triggering the bail-in process will prove unsuccessful if bank losses are not 
properly identified in some finite form. The determination of bank losses including 
                                                        
11
Geithner, 2014,  p. 306. 
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unrealized future losses must be accurately determined in order to avoid successive 
rounds of bail-in losses accruing to bank creditors. This might in fact prove a 
challenging task. For example, bank losses in the recent crisis have consistently been 
underestimated.   
 
Normally bank failures occur when macro-economic conditions have worsened, and 
asset values are falling.  Bank failures during boom conditions, e.g. resulting from 
fraud, such as Barings, are easier to handle with less danger of contagion.  In the 
uncertain conditions of generalized asset value declines, the new (incoming) 
accountants, employed by the resolution agency, are likely to take a bad scenario (or 
even a worst case) as their base case for identifying losses, to be borne by the bailed-
in creditors, partly also to minimize the above-mentioned danger of underestimation 
leading to further calls on creditors.  Previously the accountants of the failing bank 
itself will have been encouraged (by management) to take a more positive view of its 
(going concern) value.  Thus the transition to bail-in is likely to lead to a huge 
discontinuity, a massive drop, in published accounting valuations.  This could put into 
question amongst the general public the existing valuations of other banks, and lead, 
possibly rapidly, to a contagious crisis, on which we add more below. 
 
Moreover, restructuring should extend to the underlying business model, which led 
the bank to bankruptcy in the first place, to avoid several bail-in rounds in the future.  
 
2. Who Meets the Burden? 
 
(a) Overview 
 
In general, banks have three types of creditors:  
 
banking creditors, including retail and wholesale depositors, needing to use the 
provision by the bank of payment and custody services;  
 
investment business creditors, including swap counterparties, trading counterparties, 
and those with similar claims from trading activity such as exchanges, clearing 
systems and other investment business counterparties (including repo counterparties); 
 
financial creditors, comprising long term creditors of the bank, including bondholders 
and other long-term unsecured finance providers (Clifford Chance, 2011).  
 
When banking groups are resolved only the third type of creditors should be affected 
by bail-in, since banking creditors and investment business creditors will most likely 
hold claims against unaffected operating subsidiaries. This is, however, not the case 
where, under the EU approach, resolution is undertaken at the legal entity level. 
Under the BRRD business creditors may be exempted, through pre-designed “carve-
outs”. It is not inconceivable that this exemption may be utilized to shift 
disproportionately the burden of bail-in onto other classes of creditors such as 
bondholders and unprotected depositors. 
 
Arguably, in contrast to bail-outs, where all the taxpayers are, in some sense, 
domestic constituents, an advantage of bail-in is that some creditors may be foreign, 
but this is an elusive and possibly false advantage. The aim to penalise Russian 
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creditors of Cypriot banks might have played a significant role in the way that 
“rescue” was structured. Similarly the treatment of the creditors of Icelandic banks 
was organised in such a way as to give preference to domestic depositors over foreign 
bondholders
12
.  But the foreign investors would, of course, realise that they were in 
effect being targeted, so that they would both require a higher risk premium and flee 
more quickly at the first sign of potential trouble.  The result is likely to be that a 
larger proportion of bank bondholders will be other (non-bank) financial 
intermediaries of the same country, providing a further small ratchet to the 
balkanization and nationalisation of the banking system.  In any case, the BRRD 
disallows discrimination between creditors on the basis of their nationality or 
domicile, eradicating this mis-conceived advantage of bail-ins over bailouts. 
 
With a purely domestic bank, the effect of shifting from bail-out to bail-in will, 
therefore, primarily transfer the burden of loss from one set of domestic payers, the 
taxpayers, to another, the pensioners and savers. It is far from clear whether, and why, 
the latter have broader backs and are better placed to absorb bank rescue losses than 
the former.  One argument, however, is that savers, and/or their financial agents, have 
made an ex ante choice to purchase the claim on the bank, whereas the taxpayer had 
no such option, and that, having done so, they could/should have played a monitoring 
role.  While this is a valid point, the counter-argument is that charities, small or 
medium size pension funds, or individual savers, e.g., via pension funds, do not really 
have the expertise to act as effective bank monitors.  Thus, forcing them to pay the 
penalty of bank failure would hardly improve bank governance.  On the contrary it 
would only give rise to claims that they were “tricked” into buying bail-in-able debt.13 
Arguably, BRRD’s provisions (Art. 37(3)(c)(iii) and Recitals 48(a) and 78(a)) reflect 
these concerns by giving resolution authorities the power to exempt (in ‘‘exceptional 
circumstances”), from the application of the bail-in tool, liabilities held by individuals 
and SMEs beyond the level of insured deposits. The chief rationale for this 
discretionary exemption is avoidance of contagion, a very plausible concern. If it is 
applied in a wider context, this safe harbour could provide adequate protection to 
vulnerable segments of savers’ population. These are, in general, weak bank 
governance monitors and, at the same time, stable sources of cheap funding. Such 
wider (albeit ad hoc) protection would reinforce the confidence of these parts of 
society and economy in the banking system.  
 
3. Governance 
 
The treatment of bailed-in creditors, especially where creditors will be issued new 
securities rather than having their claims written-down, is likely to be complex, time-
consuming and litigation intensive.  Faced with such costs the original creditors are 
likely to sell out to those intermediaries that specialise in such situations, e.g. 
“vulture” hedge funds.  So, as already seen in the case of the Co-op Bank, ownership 
                                                        
12
 See S. Goodley, “Bondholders may take legal action against Iceland over failed banks Bondholders 
may take legal action against Iceland over failed banks”, The Guardian, 7 November 2010, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/nov/07/iceland-banks-bondholders-legal-action 
13 Would such bail-in able debt be a suitable investment for pension funds, charities, local authorities 
and individuals?  The Pensions Regulator, the Department for Communities and Local Government, 
the Charities Commission and the FCA may need to consider whether further rules in this area would 
be necessary. 
 
 14 
may fall into the hands of a group of such hedge funds
14
; the same would probably 
have happened had there been creditor bail-in in Iceland and Ireland.  In Cyprus 
creditor bail-in has given a large share of ownership to big Russian depositors.
15
  In 
theory, this problem could be resolved by placing caps on how much bail-inable debt 
different creditors could hold. In practice, however, such caps would encounter legal 
constraints, at least, under EU law. In addition, if caps are very strict, they would 
restrict the liquidity of the market for bail-inable debt and could lead to banks having 
to hold insufficient amounts of bail-inable debt, increasing the need for a public bail 
out.  
 
Inspite of their numerous disadvantages, bail-outs do give governments the power to 
direct and specify who is to take over the running of the rescued bank.  That is not the 
case with some versions of the bail-in approach. In the USA the role of the FDIC as 
‘‘trustee” of the resulting bridge company should, however, deal with this point.  But 
elsewhere the resulting governance structure could become unattractive to the 
authorities and public.  While there is a safeguard that the new managers have to be 
approved by the regulatory authorities, nevertheless the ethos, incentives and culture 
of a bank, whose ownership is controlled by a group of hedge funds for example, is 
likely to differ from that of a bank rescued by a bail-out. 
 
4. Legal Costs 
 
While there might be a few jurisdictions such as the UK where bail-in regimes can be 
established by contract, elsewhere this route would lead to a stream of litigation  
(Gleeson, 2012). As a result, in most jurisdictions, including the UK, bail-in 
regimes are given statutory force (e.g., Art. 50(2) of the BRRD). Yet this does not 
mean that litigation will be avoided when the bail-in process is triggered. Bail-in 
regimes that extend beyond D bail-inable debt clearly encroach on rights of 
property, which remain entrenched in countries’ constitutions and international 
treaties. Legal claims will be raised both by shareholders who will see their 
stakes wiped out and creditors who will see the value of their claims reduced or 
diminished16 and it is unlikely that the “no creditor worse off” principle, which 
both Dodd-Frank and the UK’s Banking Act and the BRRD (Art. 29(1)(f)) have 
adopted as a creditor safeguard under the bail-in process, will deter the expected 
stream of litigation. In fact, the principle could make litigation even more likely. 
Therefore, where the result of government action is that bailed-in creditors 
receive a demonstrably lower return than they would have done had the bank 
proceeded to disorderly liquidation, they should be compensated (Gleeson, 
2012), but by whom and in what form? Would that be in the form of shares in the 
                                                        
14
 Co-op Group, which owned the Co-operative Bank outright, eventually bowed to the demands of a 
group of bondholders, including U.S. hedge funds Aurelius Capital and Silver Point Capital, and 
agreed to a restructuring which left them with a 30 percent stake in the bank. See M. Scuffham, “Co-op 
to cede control of bank to bondholders”, Reuters, 21 Oct. 2013, available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/21/uk-coop-bank-bondholders-idUKBRE99K05O20131021 
 
15A. Illmer,  ‘Russia's rich dominate Cyprus' largest bank’, Deutsche Welle, 18 Oct. 2013, available at 
http://www.dw.de/russias-rich-dominate-cyprus-largest-bank/a-17146540 
16 E.g., see ‘‘Russian depositors begin seizing property of Cypriot banks”, Russia Today, 12 April 
2013, available at http://rt.com/business/laiki-cyprus-banks-arrest-765/ 
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NewCo or of the recapitalized operating subsidiary? Even so, rapid restoration of 
public confidence is the only way to make creditors’ converted stakes valuable. 
 
Moreover, a significant proportion of the costs of bank resolution could involve 
settling conflicts of interest among creditors (IMF, 2013).  This is particularly likely 
to be so in so far as bail-in will concentrate ownership amongst “vulture” hedge 
funds, whose métier is the use of legal means to extract large rents.  Shifting the 
burden of meeting the costs of recapitalisation from a small charge (on average) 
imposed on the generality of taxpayers to a major impost on a small group of 
creditors, easily capable of acting in unison, is almost bound to multiply the legal 
costs of such an exercise manifold, however much the legal basis of this process is 
established beforehand.   
 
This is easily explainable. In the case of taxpayer-funded bail-outs, everyone’s tax 
liabilities go up a little, (and the relative burden has, in a sense, been democratically 
reviewed and decided); in the case of creditor bail-in, a few will lose a lot, and will, 
therefore, have stronger incentive to protest and litigate.   
 
5. Funding Costs 
 
There are two aspects to this, a static and a dynamic one.  There have been numerous 
quantitative studies of the “subsidy” provided by the implicit government bail-out 
guarantee to the larger banks which are too-big-to-fail (Santos, 2014;  Morgan and 
Stiroh, 2005; Ueda and Weder-Di Mauro, 2011; Li et al. 2011).  There is sufficient 
evidence to show that Too-Big-To-Fail banks are prone to take much riskier assets 
than other banks (Afonso et al. 2014; Brandao et al. 2013; Gadanetz et al. 2012, 
Gropp et al. 2011).   
 
Such a subsidy is also criticised as undesirable and unfair distortion of competition. 
Taking advantage of lower funding costs, larger banks cut margins aggressively to 
edge out smaller competitors (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011).  Thus, the subsidy 
distorts the pattern of intermediation towards larger banks and away from smaller 
banks and non-bank intermediation, including peer-to-peer channels.  But there is a 
counter-argument. Shifting intermediation to smaller banks or to other parts of the 
financial system will take it from safer, better regulated and more transparent banks 
(including bigger banks) to riskier, less regulated, and less understood channels. In 
addition, dependent on the state of competition between banks, much of that subsidy 
will have gone to providing better terms, primarily in the shape of lower interest rates, 
to bank borrowers. Controversially, perhaps, size improves banks operating costs 
(Kovner et al. 2014).   
 
Funding costs may not be a major concern in the case of bail-inable debt but there 
might be an issue of adverse selection. First, another facet of the same, static question 
is by how much funding costs of (large) banks have to rise if they have to hold 
specifically bail-inable debt. There are a range of views about this. As in the case of 
equity (Miles et al., 2011, and Admati et al. 2011), if we compare one otherwise 
identical equilibrium with another, when the sole difference is that some categories of 
bank debt become bail-inable, it is doubtful whether the overall cost of bank funding 
would rise by much, say 10-30 bps.  Moreover, with a rising proportion of bank 
creditors at risk from bank failure, there should be a greater benefit, in terms of lower 
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funding costs, from a patently safer overall portfolio structure.  As explained in 
Section A above, one of the fundamental rationales of bail-in, is that creditors at risk 
will have an incentive to encourage bank managers to pursue prudent policies, a 
counter-weight to more risk-seeking shareholders. 
 
Secondly, bail-inable debt may affect banks’ choice of assets. If institutions are 
required to issue a minimum amount of bail-inable liabilities expressed as a 
percentage of total liabilities (rather than as a percentage of risk weighted assets), 
critically, this will impose higher costs on institutions with large amounts of assets 
with a low risk weighting (such as mortgages). Such institutions typically hold 
relatively small amounts of capital as a proportion of their total liabilities. In addition, 
institutions will face constraints on their funding models and higher costs if they are 
required to hold bail-inable liabilities in specific locations within a group (for 
example at group level when their funding is currently undertaken by their 
subsidiaries).  
That bail-in regimes will provide some ex ante incentive to more prudent behaviour 
seems undisputable. Yet market discipline failed to operate effectively ahead of the 
current financial crisis and holders of bail-inable liabilities will face the same 
difficulties as other stakeholders in assessing the health and soundness of bank 
balance sheets (See on complexity as a monitoring barrier Avgouleas and Cullen, 
2014a). 
In addition, if bank(s) nevertheless run into trouble, then utilization of the bail-in 
process will give another twist to pro-cyclicality. With bail-in, the weaker that banks 
become the harder and more expensive it will be for them to get funding.  In this 
respect high trigger Co-Cos would perform better than bail-in-able bonds.  While, in 
principle, increased creditor monitoring could translate into greater focus on prudence 
and caution for the individual banker, in the face of a generalised shock, a sizeable 
proportion of the banks in a given country will seem weaker.  Thus a shift away from 
bail-out towards bail-in is likely to reinforce procyclicality.  The ECB has been 
cautious about bailing-in bank bondholders for such reasons.
17
 
 
Of course, should the sovereign be in a weak fiscal condition, bail-out costs will give 
another twist to the “doom loop” of bank and sovereign indebtedness.  But if the costs 
of recapitalising the banks in a given country are so large, does it help to shift them 
from the taxpayer to the pension funds, insurance companies and other large domestic 
investors, and also on the surviving banks?  No doubt the crisis would take a different 
shape, but would it be any less severe?  It could be (politically) worse if people began 
to fear that their pensions were being put at risk? 
 
                                                        
17
 In his 30 July 2013 confidential letter to the then competition commissioner Joaquin Almunia, 
ECB’s President Mario Draghi was reported to have expressed key concerns about the EU’s bail-in 
regime under the draft BRRD. In particular Draghi was reported, by Reuters, who saw the letter, to 
have said that “imposing losses on junior creditors in the context of such "precautionary 
recapitalizations" could hurt subordinated bank bonds” and then adding: "… structurally impairing the 
subordinated debt market […] could lead to a flight of investors out of the European banking market, 
which would further hamper banks' funding going forward". Reuters, “Draghi asked EU to keep state 
aid rules for banks flexible”, Milan, 19 Oct  2013, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/19/us-banks-bondholders-draghi-idUSBRE99I03B20131019 
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6. Liquidity Concerns 
 
Once the bail-in process has been triggered, it is highly likely that the financial 
institution would only be able to continue conducting business with the ‘lifeline’ of 
emergency liquidity assistance. But the amount of liquidity support that could be 
provided by central banks and resolution funds (such as the Orderly Liquidation Fund 
in the US) may be constrained by a lack of sufficient high quality collateral, and by 
restrictions on any support that might result in losses falling on taxpayers. This would 
be accentuated if a number of major financial institutions had to be resolved at the 
same time. Critically, liquidity could be limited to supporting critical economic 
functions while other parts of the business are resolved. 
 
Naturally, central banks and resolution funds will be reluctant to pre-commit to 
provide liquidity support in all circumstances. They will want to ensure that a “plan 
B” option is in place, including the immediate winding down of a failing financial 
institution through rapid sales and transfers, without liquidity support, which again 
would depend on a resolution plan drawn up in advance (KPMG, 2012). However, 
implementation of such plans would negate one of the biggest advantages of (“open 
bank”) bail-in regimes, namely the continuation of the resolved entity or of operating 
subsidiaries as a going concern.  
 
7. Bank Creditors’ Flight and Contagion 
 
A desideratum for a revenue raising mechanism is that the taxed cannot easily flee.  It 
is difficult to avoid taxation, except by migration, which has many severe transitional 
costs.  In contrast it is easy to avoid being hit with the costs of creditor bail-in; you 
just withdraw or sell your claim.  Consequently, triggering the bail-in process is likely 
to generate a capital flight and a sharp rise in funding costs whenever the need for 
large-scale recapitalisations becomes apparent. Creditors who sense in advance the 
possibility of a bail-in, or creditors of institutions that are similar in terms of 
nationality or business models will have a strong incentive to withdraw deposits, sell 
debt, or hedge their positions through the short-selling of equity or the purchase of 
credit protection at an ever higher premium disrupting the relevant markets. Such 
actions could be damaging and disruptive, both to a single institution (Randell, 2011). 
and potentially to wider market confidence, a point that is also highlighted by 
proponents of the bail-in tool (Micossi et al. 2014, p. 9). In our view, market 
propensity to resort to herding at times of shock means that it is not realistic to believe 
that generalised adoption of bail-in mechanisms would not trigger contagious 
consequences that would have a destabilizing effect. 
 
Where the ceiling of guaranteed deposits is set low a significant number of large 
depositors might migrate to other schemes such as Money Market Funds or even 
Investment funds that offer higher interest rates, as in the example of contemporary 
Chinese shadow banks. It would certainly take a lot of explaining to justify why 
weakening the liquidity of the regulated banking sector and increasing its funding 
costs in order to boost liquidity levels and lower the funding costs of the unregulated 
shadow banking sector is a measure to strengthen financial stability. On the contrary, 
a lack of Lender of Last Resort type of liquidity support in the unregulated sector 
could make bank-type runs inevitable, increasing the possibility of psychological 
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spillovers into the regulated sector and generalized panic, (as occurred in the USA in 
1907). 
 
It is, of course, true that equity holders and bond holders cannot run in the same way 
that depositors can, but financial counterparties can easily do so and will do so if they 
do not immediately see a hefty capital cushion in the bailed-in bank (Sommer, 2014). 
If these flee then equity and bond holders would certainly follow and in their attempt 
to do so they would drive asset values sharply down to an extent that would make the 
option of raising new money, or rolling over existing maturing bonds, unattractive or 
virtually impossible.  In such circumstances, bank credit extension would stop, 
amplifying the downturn, lowering asset values yet further and putting the solvency of 
other banks at risk.  Excluding depositors of all brands from bail-in might reduce the 
danger of contagion but would not remove it.  
8. International Coordination 
 
The resolution of G-SIFIs with bail-in is examined in Appendix A. However, some 
thoughts are apposite here to provide a fuller evaluation of bail-in advantages and 
disadvantages. In our view, the top-down SPOE approach adopted by the US 
regulators is conceptually superior. Assets and liabilities at the operating subsidiary 
level are not part of the painful debt restructuring bail-in exercise and may continue 
operations regardless. There are however four clear disadvantages in implementing 
this approach in the case of G-SIFIs.  
First, the (unaffected by resolution) operating subsidiary might, nevertheless, suffer a 
flight due to reputational contagion, which triggers an irrational but quite likely panic, 
regardless of parent’s ability to sufficiently recapitalize the operating parts of the 
group through conversion of bail-in-able liabilities. Secondly, apart from closely 
inter-related banking markets like the UK and the US, where the level of trust 
between national authorities is high, it is doubtful if any form of non-binding bilateral 
arrangements, including MOUs, would hold in the event of a cross-border banking 
crisis, involving a transfer of funds from one jurisdiction to another (Sommer, 2014). 
The gulf between regulators will become even deeper, if the majority of a certain 
form of group level funding (e.g., tripartite repos) is booked with a specific subsidiary 
that is not based in the same place as the HoldCo being resolved (Skeel, 2014). 
Thirdly, it is arguable that when the subsidiary is ring-fenced the regulators may 
expect the subsidiary creditors, as well as shareholders like the HoldCo, to bear the 
cost of bail-in. Fourthly, the top-down approach could increase scope for arbitrage 
and regulatory forbearance. In most cases it will be the home country regulator that 
will have the final word as regards the level of D bail-inable debt to be held by the 
HoldCo. But D bail-inable debt could prove more expensive than other subordinated 
debt. Thus, a home regulator concerned about the health of banks in its domestic 
market would be much less keen on increasing the cost of funding of its banks, unless 
legally bound to do so through bilateral or multilateral arrangements with host 
authorities. In fact, the absence of such arrangements could trigger multiple races to 
the bottom meaning that many HoldCos might not have a sufficient level of D bail-
able debt to recapitalize the group subsidiaries. In addition, there could also be 
circumstances where home resolution authorities are reluctant to use the bail-in tool 
because of its adverse impact on specific groups of creditors (KPMG, 2012). 
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A host resolution authority might be tempted to trigger its own resolution and bail-in 
powers if it was concerned that it might not receive sufficient support from the new 
bridge holding company to meet losses at, and/or to preserve critical economic 
functions in, its local subsidiary. Art 87 of the BRRD explicitly extends this power 
beyond subsidiaries to branches of institutions from outside the EU. By means of this 
provision, EU member states can apply resolution tools, including bail-in, to such 
branches to protect local depositors and to preserve financial stability, independent of 
any third country resolution procedure, if the third country has failed to act. Similarly, 
subject to a number of conditions and on the basis EU of financial stability concerns, 
the BRRD (Art. 86) gives the right to European resolution authorities to refuse to 
enforce third country resolution proceedings over EU-based subsidiaries.   
Accordingly the kind of international cooperation required to allow a top-down 
approach to operate effectively is unprecedented and it might well form the most 
challenging aspect of cross-border implementation of bail-in recapitalisation in the 
case of G-SIFIs. 
 
D. Conclusions 
“As the emerging-market crises and the entire history of financial crises made clear, 
imposing haircuts on bank creditors during a systemic panic is a sure way to 
accelerate the panic”18 
While we fully understand the revulsion from too-big-to-fail banks and the (political) 
cost of bailouts, we are worried that the development of a bandwagon may conceal 
from its many proponents some of the disadvantages of the new bail-in 
regimes.  While bail-in may, indeed, be much superior in several contexts, notably in 
the case of idiosyncratic failure, the resort to bail-in may disappoint unless everyone 
involved is fully aware of the potential downsides of the new approach.  
A bail-in mechanism used for the recapitalisation of a bank as going concern has the 
following advantages, vis-à-vis a bail-out approach:- 
 Lower levels of moral hazard 
 Better creditor monitoring 
 Protects taxpayers 
 Places the burden more fairly 
 Should improve ex ante behaviour of bank management 
 Mitigates the Sovereign/bank debt “doom-loop” 
 
But the bail-in process may also have some important disadvantages over bailouts, as 
it could prove to be:- 
 more contagious and procyclical 
 more litigious 
 slower and more expensive as a process 
 requiring greater subsequent liquidity injections 
 leading to deterioration of governance 
 requiring higher funding costs to banks 
 providing a worse outlook for bank borrowers 
                                                        
18  Geithner, 2014, p. 214. 
 20 
 worsening ex post outcomes 
 
That the second list is longer than the first is no indication of which approach should 
be favoured. This paper is not intended to claim that the proposed reforms will make 
the process of dealing with failing banks necessarily worse.  Its purpose is, instead, to 
warn that the exercise may have costs and disadvantages, which, unless fully 
appreciated, could make the outcome less successful than hoped.  The authorities will 
no doubt claim that they have already, and fully, appreciated all such points, as and 
where relevant. But we would contend that many advocates of moving to the latter do 
not mention such disadvantages at all, or only partially.  Perhaps the choice should 
depend on context.  
 
The bail-in process seems, in principle, a suitable substitute to resolution (whether 
liquidation of a gone concern, or some other form of resolution in a going concern 
bank) in the case of smaller domestic financial institutions. It could also be used 
successfully to recapitalize domestic SIFIs, but only if the institution has failed due to 
its own actions and omissions and not due to a generalized systemic crisis (Gleeson, 
2012). Otherwise, a flight of creditors from other institutions, i.e., contagion, may be 
uncontainable. Even so, successful bail-in recapitalization would require rapid 
restoration of market confidence (Sommer, 2014), accurate evaluation of losses, and 
successful restructuring of the bailed in bank’s operations to give it a sound business 
model to avoid successive rounds of bail-in rescues. It could, of course, prove very 
hard for regulators to secure all those pre-requisites of a successful bail-in 
recapitalisation in the event of a systemic crisis.  
Moreover, generic structural, governance, legal, and other risks and costs associated 
with a cross-border resolution of a G-SIFI (discussed in Appendix A) make the use of 
the process highly uncertain in its outcome, unless failure was clearly idiosyncratic, 
for example, as a result of fraud.  
Given these shortcomings and costs of bail-in bank recapitalisation, orderly and 
timely resolution of a G-SIFI would still require fiscal commitments. These could be 
established by means of ex ante burden sharing agreements, concluded either 
independently or by means of commitments entrenched in G-SIFI living wills 
(Avgouleas, Goodhart, Schoenmaker, 2013). Moreover, over-reliance on bail-in could 
deepen the trend towards disintegration of the internal market in the EU (CEPS, 
2014), while providing uncertain benefits. So, effective recapitalization of ailing 
banks may still require a credible fiscal backstop. In addition, a fiscal backstop may 
be essential to avert, in the case of deposits held in the same currency across a 
common currency area, a flight of deposits from member states with weaker 
sovereigns to the member states with solvent sovereigns (Schoenmaker, 2014). This is 
more or less a Eurozone specific risk, unless the current structures on the use of ESM 
funds are gradually loosened. EU policy-makers ought to continue their efforts to 
build one instead of relying on the unproven thesis that the bail-in process can resolve 
the recapitalization challenges facing the Eurozone banking sector.  
 
Finally, achieving the goal of making private institutions responsible for their actions 
would be the best policy in an ideal world where financial “polluters” would be held 
responsible for their actions. But, in practice, it might prove an unattainable goal. 
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Some of the aforementioned obstacles to effective bail-in, especially in the case of 
cross-border groups, could prove insurmountable. If this turns out to be the case then 
developed societies might have to accept that granting some form of public insurance 
is an inevitable tax for having a well functioning banking sector. At the same time, 
other forms of regulation like structural reform and cycle adjustable leverage ratios 
(plus more emphasis on the prior Recovery stage), if they prove to make banks more 
stable, should come to the forefront with renewed force.  
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Appendix A 
The SPOE Approach with Bail-in: Important Challenges 
 
1. The Cross-border dimension 
 
Cross-border coordination - While the SPOE approach in the event of a cross-border 
resolution involving jurisdictions with long history of cooperation like the US and the 
UK makes good sense, especially from the resolution effectiveness viewpoint - UK 
authorities have stated that they are ready to step aside and give the FDIC a free hand 
in the event of resolution of a G-SIFI with UK subsidiaries (Tucker, 2014) - there is 
little assurance that other overseas authorities will feel the same. In order to avoid the 
possibility of home authorities interfering with transfers to, or from, foreign 
subsidiaries of the resolved group in the course of resolution, host regulators may 
force foreign subsidiaries to operate as ring-fenced entities increasing the trend 
towards disintegration of global banking markets. While this might sound like a 
reasonable strategy it gives rise to two undesirable consequences. First, capital and 
other resources within the banking group are not employed efficiently. Worse, during 
bad times the group is not able to shift resources from a healthy subsidiary to a 
troubled subsidiary. The latter may be located in a country that is in trouble itself and 
would greatly welcome an injection of capital and liquidity by the parent to the 
troubled subsidiary (Baer, 2014, p. 15). Secondly, recent data show that it has serious 
consequences for cross-border capital flows and investment and levels of global 
growth (FT, Jan. 2014
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).  
 
Liquidity provision as part of the resolution funding framework: meeting the liquidity 
requirements of the operating subsidiaries of the resolved group could be a 
challenging task, given also that access to market-based liquidity might be severely 
restricted for the resolved group. In the US, in the event of resolution of a SIFI under 
OLA, the bridge holding company will downstream liquidity, as necessary, to 
subsidiaries through intra-company advances. When this is not sufficient the FDIC 
will act as provider of liquidity through loans to the bridge company or any covered 
subsidiaries that enjoy super-seniority, or by granting of guarantees (section 204 of 
the Dodd Frank Act). Yet the issue is far from resolved as such loans and guarantees 
might not prove sufficient, especially if the quality of the collateral is not of a very 
high grade and the FDIC has not concealed that fact (FDIC, 2013). Normally, a G-
SIFI is funded mostly through retail, and other short-term, deposits, which in the 
event of a bail-in could either dry up or even be withdrawn.   So, as commonly 
recognized, a group in resolution may require considerable official liquidity 
support.  This should only be provided on a fully collateralized basis, with appropriate 
haircuts applied to the collateral, to reduce further the risk of loss, but this depends on 
the adequacy of the available collateral.  
 
In the UK, the policy for liquidity provision in resolution follows the provisions of the 
EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The BRRD provides that 
                                                        
19
 ‘The flow of money through the global financial system is still stuck at the same level as a decade 
ago, raising fresh concerns about the strength of the economic recovery following six years of financial 
crisis . . . ’ These findings were based on research carried by the McKinsey Global Institute for the 
Financial Times and was published by this journal on 7 January 20014. 
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resolution will primarily be financed by national resolution funds that can also borrow 
from each other (Art 97).  The BRRD does not rule out provision of liquidity, in the 
event of resolution by the central bank. 
 
The BRRD treats the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) as a creditor that can be 
bailed-in, with the costs of this falling on other firms, which have to fund the Scheme. 
Thus, the requisite DGS will have to contribute for the purpose of ensuring 
continuous access to covered deposits and relevant contributions will be  in cash for 
an amount equivalent to the losses that the DGS would have had to bear in normal 
insolvency proceedings. Namely, the DGS contribution is made in cash in order to 
absorb the losses from the covered deposits. In order to provide for sufficient funding, 
the DGS will rank pari passu with unsecured non-preferred claims.  
 
Under the BRRD menber states are allowed to merge the administrative strutures of 
the DGS with the Resolution Fund. But, even if Member states implement shared 
administrative structures, the sources of financing of DGS and the Resolution Fund 
must remain separate, The DGS is solely liable for the protection of covered 
depositors. If following a contribution by the DGS, the institution under resolution 
fails at a later stage and the DGS does not have sufficient funds to repay depositors, 
the DGS must have arrangements in place in order to raise the corresponding amounts 
as soon as possible from its members. Otherwise, treating the DGS as an unsecured 
depositor in the event of a systemic crisis might raise doubt about the sufficiency of 
funds available to it.  
 
Location of bail-inable debt and of bank deposits: Another important issue is where 
the debt is located, namely, which entity within the group holds the debt. The joint 
FDIC-BoE paper envisages that, at least for UK groups, bail-able debt will be issued 
by the top operating companies within a group, which, however, may operate in 
different jurisdictions. This means that the SPOE approach might prove elusive for 
non-US G-SIFIs. For G-SIFIs with substantial operations in the US, the Federal 
Reserve has introduced a final rule, implementing its Dodd-Frank mandate, requiring 
these operations to be held through a US holding company (FRB, 2014).
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  In the 
absence of MOUs similar to the one signed between the FDIC and the BoE, it is not 
clear whether the US authorities would seek to resolve the US operations on a stand-
alone basis (by applying the SPOE approach within the US), or would stand back and 
allow the overseas parent to be resolved without the US authorities taking action. 
 
The proportion of foreign creditors can go up dramatically when we move from 
purely domestic banks to cross-border banks with numerous foreign branches or 
subsidiaries.  Most SIFIs, and all G-SIFIs, are cross-border.  Indeed, the thrust of 
                                                        
20
 In a substantial break with past practice FRB’s final rule requires large Foreign Banking 
Organisations with $50 billion or more of (non-branch) assets in U.S.-chartered subsidiaries and all 
foreign SIFIs to place all their U.S. operations in a U.S.-based intermediate holding company (“IHC”) 
on which the FRB will impose enhanced capital, liquidity and other prudential requirements on those 
IHCs, separate from and in addition to the requirements of the parent company’s home country 
supervisor. Federal Reserve system, “Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and 
Foreign Banking”, 18 Feb. 2014. 
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many recent proposals for bank resolution, for example those of the UK Independent 
Commission on Banking (Vickers Report) as incorporated with amendments in the 
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 and some earlier Swiss measures, has 
been to limit taxpayer contingent liability to the local, domestic part of the bank.  But 
not only will this lead towards further balkanization and localization of banking 
systems, it also raises the question of how far bail-in of only ring-fenced entities is 
consistent with a Single Point of Entry (SPOE) resolution mechanisms.   
 
Moreover, legal disputes, and shareholder and creditor objections, will become even 
more acute where a subsidiary of the holding company is on the verge of failure, 
while the holding company has other viable and valuable subsidiaries. In such a case 
it could be perceived as disproportionate to cancel the claims of existing shareholders 
in the holding company since these retain significant value by virtue of the value of 
the non-failing group subsidiaries. Even if a value is placed on solvent subsidiaries, so 
that holding group shareholders are issued new shares of reduced value rather than 
being wiped out, the bail-in process will be protracted. This development could 
potentially have a seriously destabilising impact on the institution that is being 
resolved, since only speedy resolution can prevent a creditor run on the institution. 
 
Resolving Systemic Subsidiaries:  Equally challenging would be the application of 
SPOE to bail-in when overseas subsidiaries need to be resolved because they are both 
loss-making and are undertaking critical economic functions (KPMG 2012, Gleeson, 
2012).  It may not be possible, or efficient, to resolve them through an injection of 
capital from the parent holding company. Overseas resolution authorities may choose 
to exercise their own national resolution powers to intervene in the overseas 
subsidiaries – or even branches – of US and UK G-SIFIs. This would be consistent 
with the “multiple points of entry” (MPE) approach that underpins the EU BRRD, 
and with the growing trend towards “localisation” under which overseas host 
authorities seek to protect their national positions through the ring-fencing of the 
operations of foreign firms in their countries. 
 
2. The EU Approach 
 
By contrast to the FDIC-BoE approach, the EU will operate the bail-in regime on a 
legal entity basis (with the option of group level resolution also available subject to 
the BRRD conditions), although the BRRD provides for a consolidated group 
approach, based on close cooperation and coordination through resolution colleges 
and on group level resolution plans agreed in advance. So, in the event of a group 
resolution, each national authority would apply bail-in (and other resolution tools) to 
each entity based in its jurisdiction.  
 
This reflects the different legal and operating structures across Europe and the fact 
that each member state operates, for now, its own Deposit Guarantee Scheme. But 
once the new Single Resolution Mechanism comes into force, Euro-wide resolution 
would be conducted by a single authority and SPOE could become an option, but 
MPE will still be the adopted route for subsidiaries located in the UK and other EU 
member states that are not part of the European Banking Union. 
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